Christopher J. Buckley

‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’. This theme and its variations have been heard so often, that it has become impossible to agree on a single definition of terrorism that exclusively satisfies everyone. There are certain components that tend to appear in more authoritative attempts to define this elusive term, however none is without its difficulties. The first focuses on the nature of the targeted victims. The deliberate killing of innocent civilians is a central element in most established definitions of terrorism. This can certainly not be argued as the only criterion, however. By this definition the bombings of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Dresden by the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain would have to be considered terrorism. Whatever else these actions might have constituted, most would not regard them as an act of terrorism. This being the case, why is it that the attacks on the Pentagon and the Marine barracks in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia are widely regarded as acts of terrorism – certainly by the U.S. Government – even though the targets were primarily military.

A second element that often factors into the definition of terrorism concerns the nature of those who commit the violence. According to several definitions of terrorism, only groups that are not part of the official apparatus of the state can commit terrorism. Dershowitz writes that a ‘distinguishing characteristic of what many people regard as terrorism’, and the characteristic of what many people regard as terrorism, ‘is its shadowy nature’. The majority of acts of terrorism are difficult to pin on individual nation states. Instead, they are committed by unofficial groups that have no standing army and no ‘return address’ where preventive or retaliatory attacks can be carried out. The terrorist carries out his murderous duty, then slips quietly back into the civilian population, or is sometimes killed. The modern terrorist is not someone we can simply put into any stereotypical category, as increasingly the terrorist might be a women, a teenager, or even a child. The actual word ‘terrorism’ has its historical origins not in the actions of shadowy groups, but in acts of terror inflicted by the state on its own citizens. Dershowitz observes that the ‘reign of terror, conducted by the revolutionary government of France was the paradigm’. It is worthwhile noting that terror was an integral part of the Stalinist, Nazi, Peronist, and other totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.

The third aspect to consider when considering defining terrorism, seeks to include the mechanism by which those who engage in violence seek to influence the actions and attitudes of their intended audiences. Terrorists seek to attract attention to their cause by employing, or directly threatening, sensational acts of violence that seize the attention of the media, serving to terrorise populations. One academic characterised terrorism as ‘propaganda by deed’. Dershowitz seeks to further elaborate this as ‘by violent and deadly deeds, often against the vulnerable and innocent of victims, and often only as an initial step in a multifaceted program of violence’. As Clausewitz once commented, if ‘war is a mere continuation of policy of other means’ then terrorism is war by other means. Criminal organisations have a history of employing the technique of terror. However, in this case their objectives are financial rather than military, religious or nationalistic.

Consequently, and not surprisingly, there is very little established agreement on the meaning of the word ‘terrorism’. It is regarded as an extraordinary and extreme form of political behaviour; its historical, political, economic, religious and social causes far from clear. Terrorism is extremely diffuse, indeed an explicit definition is often not even attempted, and when the matter is broached, it is routinely admitted that there is ‘no single universally accepted definition of the term’. Even the various agencies of the U.S. government are not united, offering very different definitions of terrorism. The U.S. State Department, for example, uses the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656(d):

. . .premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience

The U.S Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as

. . . the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives,

whereas the U.S. Department of Defence defines it as

. . .the unlawful use of – or threatened use of – force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.

Bruce Hoffman concedes that ‘not surprisingly, each of the above definitions reflects the priorities and particular interests of the specific agency involved’. The State Department’s emphasis is on the premeditated and planned, or calculated, nature of terrorism in direct contrast to more spontaneous acts of political violence. Its definition is also the only one of the three to place emphasis on both the ineluctably political nature of terrorism and the perpetrators’ fundamental ‘sub-national’ characteristic. Notably, the State Department’s definition is sufficiently lacking when it comes to considering the psychological dimension of terrorism. Hoffman believes Terrorism to be as much ‘about the threat of violence as the violent act itself, and accordingly, is deliberately conceived to have far reaching psychological repercussions beyond the actual target of the act among a wider, watching, ‘target’ audience’. As Brian Jenkins carefully noted just over two decades ago, ‘terrorism is theatre’. Quite simply, the terrorist prefers a lot of people watching rather than a lot of people dead.

The Department of Defence’s definition is arguably the most complete of the above definitions. As Hoffman notes, their definition seeks to highlight the threat of the terrorist equally as much as the actual act of violence, focusing on terrorism’s targeting of whole societies as well as governments and state apparatus. Notably, the Department of Defence cites the religious and ideological aims of terrorism alongside its fundamental political objectives – however, omits the crucial social dimensions founds in the FBI’s definition.

So, just why is the word ‘terrorism’ seemingly so difficult to define? Hoffman observes that ‘as the meaning and usage of the word have changed over time to accommodate the political vernacular and discourse of each successive era, terrorism has proved increasingly elusive in the face of attempts to construct one consistent definition’. Indeed, earlier terrorist practitioners were far more willing to co-operate in this endeavour than their contemporaries. Early terrorists didn’t suppress their terrorist desires or hide behind such semantics such as ‘freedom fighter’ or ‘urban guerrilla’.

Indeed, the nineteenth century anarchists unashamedly and with forthright, proclaimed themselves to be terrorists and admitted their tactics to be that of terrorism. By the middle of the 20th Century, however, this forthright language was beginning to quell. The Jewish terrorist organisation of the 1940’s known as Lehi is thought to be one of the last terrorist organisations to publicly describe itself as such. Similarly, more than twenty years later the Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Marighela pulled no punches when it came to the avocation of terrorist tactics , yet he still insisted on portraying himself and his followers as ‘urban guerrillas’ rather than ‘urban terrorists’. Furthermore, it is clear from Marighela’s writings that he was fully aware of the word’s undesirable connotations, and took steps to replace them with more favourable ones. The usage of the words ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ have acquired an intensely negative connotation in contemporary discourse. Part of the explanation is the perception that terrorism targets (innocent) people who should not be targeted, and involves methods that should not be employed, for example, the taking and killing of hostages. Accordingly, the perpetrators of terrorist acts are commonly perceived to be morally depraved, even when the terrorist is willing to sacrifice their own life to further their cause.

There is one point that political scientists generally all agree on: terrorism is a pejorative term. It is a word with distinctly negative connotations that is generally applied to one’s enemies and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore. Brian Jenkins wrote that ‘what is called terrorism, thus seems to depend on one’s point of view. Use of the term implies a moral judgement; and if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint’. Hoffman believes that the decision to call someone or label an organisation ‘terrorist’ thus becomes almost unavoidably subjective, depending largely on whether one sympathises with or opposes the person/group/cause concerned. If one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is classed as terrorism.

On the other hand, if one identifies with the perpetrator, the violent act is regarded in a more sympathetic, if not positive light; and it is not classed as terrorism. This statement could not be better demonstrated than when, following the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, then UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim urged the UN member states to take practical steps that might prevent further bloodshed. Whilst most member states supported the Secretary-General, a minority of Arab states and various African and Asian countries sought to derail the discussions. They argued that ‘people who struggle to liberate themselves from foreign oppression and exploitation have the right to use all methods at their disposal, including force’.

The delegates from the Third World attempted to justify their stance with two arguments. They first claimed that all bona-fide liberation movements are invariably labelled as ‘terrorists’ by the regimes against which their struggles for freedom are directed. For example, the Nazi’s labelled resistance groups who opposed Germany’s occupation of their lands, ‘terrorists’. Therefore, by seeking to condemn terrorism the UN was effectively endorsing the power of the strong over the weak – in effect, acting to defend the status quo. Secondly, the delegates argued that it is not the violence itself that is germane, but its ‘underlying causes’: that is, the ‘misery, frustration, grievance and despair’ that produce such violent atrocities. As a result of these actions, UN efforts to make substantial progress on international co-operation against terrorism were throttled.

It is perhaps comforting to know, that even the wisest of scholars and respected experts have struggled to come up with an all-encompassing definition of ‘terrorism’. Indeed, Alex Schmid devoted more than a hundred pages to examining more than a hundred definitions of terrorism in an effort to discover a reasonably acceptable, comprehensive explication of the word. Four years and a second edition later, Schmid was no closer in achieving his quest, conceding in the first sentence of his revised volume that the ‘search for an adequate definition is still on’. In his ground-breaking work on the subject, Walter Laqueur experienced immense trouble trying to define terrorism. Eventually concluding that ‘it is neither possible to do so nor worthwhile to make the attempt’. Responding to a survey on definitions by Schmid, Laqueur asserted that ‘ten years of debates on typologies and definitions have not enhanced our knowledge of the subject to a significant degree’.

Throughout, this essay has deliberately not attempted to explicitly define the word terrorism, but rather to demonstrate the elements that factor into attempted definitions of the word; as well as demonstrating just how variable the term ‘terrorism’ actually is. In Inside Terrorism, Hoffman, whilst acknowledging the obvious difficulties with defining the word, sought to attempt his own definition. It is with this definition that this essay concludes.

Hoffman sought firstly to distinguish terrorists from other types of criminals, then to distinguish terrorism from other types of crime. He concluded that terrorism is the ‘deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change’. It is important to note that all terrorist acts involve either violence or the direct threat of violence. Terrorism directly seeks to establish far-reaching psychological effects, going beyond the immediate victim or object of the terrorist attack. It is designed to instil fear, seeking to intimidate a wider target audience.

This audience can include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or just public opinion in general. Specifically, terrorism is ‘designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little’. Through their actions – violent or non violent – terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they require to effect political change on either a local or international stage.