Christopher J. Buckley

In the United States, the issue of National Missile Defense (NMD) is one that has been a topic of some considerable debate since the 1960’s. The basic idea is to shield the U.S. against incoming missiles by shooting them down as they approach the country.

In March, 1983, President Reagan announced plans for a new American missile defence program. The plan was known formally as the ‘Strategic Defence Initiative’, but detractors soon labeled it ‘Star Wars’. Reagan’s public goal was not just to protect the U.S and her allies, but also to offer the completed system to the USSR, thus seeking to end the threat of nuclear war for all parties.
During the Congressional debates, Democrats sought to challenge the feasibility and strategic wisdom of the program. In stark contrast, Republicans sought to demonstrate its strategic necessity and provided numerous technical experts who asserted that the program was indeed feasible. The advocates of the SDI won the argument, and funding was set aside for the program in the fiscal year 1984. However, motivation for the effort largely collapsed with the demise of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War.

When the Bush administration finally entered into office, they were already deeply committed to the deployment of a missile defence, even willing to substantially modify or indeed withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Indeed, on December 14, 2001, President Bush indicated that the U.S was withdrawing from the ABM treaty.

Under Bush, the goal of missile defence has moved to the rather more modest goal of preventing the United States being subject to nuclear terrorism by states termed infamously by the President as ‘rogue’. The current project still remains fiercely controversial. Although most, but certainly not all, defence analysts believe the ability to intercept a small missile attack is technologically possible, many have questioned whether it is a safer strategy than the present one of nuclear deterrence.

It is not hard to realise why many defence analysts find America’s new found enthusiasm for missile defence troubling. The current catalysts for Washington’s embrace of missile defence – until their invasion, Iraq – North Korea and Iran, all allegedly possess(ed) an increasing build up of weapons of mass destruction. We know that subsequent efforts to find WMD in Iraq have proved fruitless. However, America still believes the threat posed by Iran and North Korea to be cause for concern. Is this cause for concern justified, or is America allowing itself to realise a credible enemy that simply does not exist? The next chapter deals with Europe’s attitude towards missile defence, demonstrating that whilst Europe shares American concerns about proliferation, it does not believe rogue states pose the same threat to the U.S as Washington does.

American politicians harbouring doubts about Bush’s seemingly insatiable drive for missile defence have found a common friend in Europe. Europe still relies heavily on America for defence, but the planned missile defence system could allow America to recluse itself, safe in the knowledge that she was protected, although American argument is that a missile defence system would allow America to act more willingly in defence of its European allies. It is not immediately obvious whether European leaders fully trust America to come to their aid should they require America’s protection. Indeed, France is leading the way to create a ‘European Reaction Force’ – essentially, a Federal European Army, an Army which would severely undermine America’s commitment to Europe and NATO.

But why should such close allies disagree so fundamentally in the first place? The first factor appears to be the interpretation of the perceived potential threat. As Philip Gordon notes, ‘the first and most fundamental factor seems to be the assessment, or more precisely, the interpretation of the potential threat’. It isn’t the case that European’s make different assessments about growing ballistic and WMD capabilities, rather they seek to question the ability or ruthlessness of the state to actually deploy their capabilities against the West. Dominant European states have argued that states such as N. Korea, Iran, Libya and until recently, Iraq could not directly threaten a superpower like the United States. The threats were called ‘microscopic – or theoretical’ by the then French Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine.

In contract, the Americans argue the very fact that these countries are devoting such a large resource of their limited resources to ballistic and WMD programmes is a sign that they have some perceived utility. However, many Europeans believe that utility to be one of a bargaining tool, not one to be used to directly threaten the United States. Many commentators belief that North Korea previously used its WMD programme as leverage over the previous Clinton administration in return for economic concessions, promising in return to halt development of their WMD. Now in 2004, we see North Korea employing the same tactic. To growing concern within the international community, the Bush administration has taken a rather more hard-line stance to the previous administration, refusing to allow herself to fall victim to nuclear blackmail. When dealing with North Korea, America believes that if it can protect itself from the threat N. Korea poses they will not have their hand forced at the bargaining table again.

The resulting differing attitudes towards threat assessments between America and her European allies stem largely from the fact that ‘Europeans are not in the habit of picturing themselves in combat with any of these potential adversaries, whereas Americans are’. If hostilities break out between two countries it would be the United States who assume the responsibility for the mounting of a military defence. The United States would argue that they, the worlds only remaining superpower, require insurance against a potential adversary’s ballistic and nuclear arsenal. If they do not have the ability to defend themselves against this threat their willingness for military intervention is vastly reduced, if not eliminated. Indeed, this argument is arguably the Bush administrations most convincing argument for NMD. At first reading it does seem plausible that the ability of rogue states to gain WMD-armed ICBMs will influence Washington’s perceptions and behaviour. However, this belief would be misplaced. Detailed are 4 arguments that undermine Washington’s faith in NMD.

Firstly, and most importantly, America’s NMD system will be, by their own admission, both modest in capability and imperfectly effective. Whilst imperfect defences may reduce the risk of a ICBM hitting American soil, it will certainly not 100%prevent it. As Miller succinctly points out, ‘If the United States is so sensitive to the deterrent threats of adversaries that even tiny holdings of WMD and missiles are able to paralyse it, then it should still be paralysed even if defences are deployed because it will still be vulnerable to the attacking weapons that are not destroyed by imperfect defences.’ Furthermore, the modest defences envisioned by the Bush administration are only currently able to handle ‘handfuls’ of attacking warheads. This leaves the United States extremely vulnerable to any enemy able to manufacture and launch the limited capacity of American defences. Bush’s missile defence proposal will leave the United States imperfectly protected against smaller threats and completely exposed against larger threats. Thus, the United States will still remain at risk even after its NMD scheme is complete. As Miller concludes, ‘missile defences are clearly not the solution if America is still extremely risk-averse and easily deterred’.

Secondly, not all WMD are delivered via ICBMs. A missile defence would do nothing to patch America’s continued vulnerability against attack by other methods of delivery. Remember, a missile defence shield would not have served any usefulness in preventing the attacks on 9/11. There has certainly been no suggestion that the United States is, or ever will be, invulnerable to other sources of WMD threat. Thus, there is no reason to assume that the U.S will be deterred without defences but undeterred with them. The risk of attack and America’s vulnerability to attack will still exist in either circumstance. Defences do not solve the problem if the mere threat of even a small WMD strike is enough to paralyse the United States.
Third, if the U.S is able to deter WMD threats it might face in the future, there would still be no reason for it to be deterred from international involvement or military intervention. Although many within the Bush administration would like to scale back their foreign policy involvement, America’s position as the only superpower, and as such, the worlds police, simply would not govern this. During the Cold War, it can be confidently argued that the stability mutual deterrence provided made it possible for large-scale conventional war despite the ever present spectre of nuclear missiles.

This same logic, argues Miller, can be applied to the heavily skewed deterrent relationships that might exist between the United States and hostile proliferators. Intervention by the U.S would take place shielded by America’s deterrent threats. There is always the risk that deterrence will fail, but then this risk also applies as much to missile defence.

Lastly, the U.S cannot allow itself to be deterred by the limited missile capabilities possessed by lesser states without enhancing the perceived perception that WMD-armed missiles possess enormous utility against the military giant of the U.S. If rogue states were to catch onto this notion, it could well fuel undesirable proliferation of WMD. By building up their stockpiles, rogue states would seek to demonstrate to the U.S that they are able to effectively neutralise America’s over-whelming military supremacy. This is surely the very thing America wishes to avoid, yet her NMD scheme could serve to only accelerate proliferation. In the case of North Korea, American intelligence has already indicated it believes their stockpile is increasing.
In response to this, Miller writes that, ‘The United States has a huge interest in squelching the perception that hostile states can counterbalance U.S power via proliferation’. As a result, a belief in the effectiveness of U.S threats of deterrent means that Washington can act. Miller expands this notion further, ‘concern about disproving the efficacy of others’ deterrent threats against the United States may cause American decision-makers to believe that they must act’.

Interestingly, defence specialists have previously concluded that as a result, the U.S is actually more likely to intervene in instances where the aggressor possesses WMD than when it does not. It can be concluded that the U.S should, and will not, be deterred from intervention by WMD missile threats from regional proliferators. Furthermore, as Miller concludes, ‘there is no reason to believe that the deployment of modest, imperfect and unreliable defences will serve as an effective cure to highly risk-averse behaviour by the U.S.’

The last chapter addresses Washington’s belief that missile defences will discourage proliferation. It will be demonstrated that this school of thought is, at best, misguided. The very same rogue states that are regarded as undeterrable by Washington, are also similarly assumed to be readily discouraged from their pursuit of WMD capabilities by the deployment of a modest American missile defence. Bush’s administration takes the view that, ‘failure to deploy missile defence invites missile proliferation’. Does the United States really believe that their opponents will give up their efforts to build a substantial WMD threat simply because America might possess the ability to neutralise a few of them? Most analysts believe the exact opposite will happen. The deployment of missile defence is likely to produce an offence-defence arms race, indeed this point is supported by historical evidence. Miller argues that ‘if adversarial states are capable enough to be taken seriously as intercontinental threats, then they will be capable enough to pursue a variety of measures that might negate or defeat US missile defences’. This is especially poignant, because these states will have numerous years to respond to the fairly slow development of missile defences.

Options available to them includes, expanding their WMD capabilities, funding research into decoys – a relatively cheap and cost effective way of confusing the defender – and the use of WMD via another means of delivery. If a state was willing to actually launch ICBMs armed with WMD, they would certainly take the risk of bombing U.S missile defences, leaving the door open for a tactical nuclear strike. It is easy to conclude that U.S missile defence will work to discourage potential proliferators, and that they will simply lie down in their efforts to develop WMD. However, the more likely scenario is that American missile defence deployments will only succeed in provoking the build up nuclear arsenal’s that, are not only larger, but also more sophisticated. As Chomsky worryingly points out, it is not just rogue states that will seek to increase their nuclear arsenal, ‘The Chinese are surely going to respond to a so called missile defense system since it eliminates their strategic nuclear capacity, so instead of having twenty missiles targeting the United States they’ll build it up and probably have a submarine launched capacity. That sets off a new cycle. China increases its missile capacity, India responds. India increases it and Pakistan responds.’ Ultimately, America’s missile defence shield will do precious little to reduce nuclear proliferation, it only serves to expediate it.

After the events of 9/11, Bush launched what he termed a ‘War on Terror’. This supposed war is intended to increase the security of the United States. As part of this ‘war’, Bush has escalated funding and the political drive for a nuclear missile defence. As the middle part of this essay evidenced, missile defences represent a high cost antidote to a threat that is largely speculative. As the concluding part of the essay demonstrates, the further America advances its Star Wars program, the further they risk provoking WMD proliferation among countries America would prefer to not escalate their arsenal. As these states build up their WMD arsenal, the likelyhood of them falling into terrorist hands increases – rogue states, especially, require money to fund their WMD programmes, terrorist groups have the funds and the cause to use their illicit goods, it does not take a smart man to put two and two together. If America were serious about a true war on terror, it would abandon its misguided missile defence efforts and work to increase funding and intelligence activities to stop further WMD proliferation, not seek to indirectly escalate it. Ultimately, only time will tell what consequences Bush’s missile defence programme will bring, however most are agreed, we live in far less safe times than we did as little as 4 years ago.

Written: April 2004