Christopher J. Buckley

The Military presents special problems of political control in practically every society. The armed forces are not only specialists in the use and implementation of force but their qualities of organisation in areas such as firm discipline, good communications and, as stated by Hague and Harrop (1982) “substantial spirit de corps” which makes the military at least as important a political institution as the bureaucracy. The military, more than any other group in society, has the capability to seize power, and hold onto it by force.

When political control of the military is not secured either by traditional, penetrative or liberal means the danger of a coup is always prevalent. The dangers of a military coup being staged are highest in the “praetorian” societies of the third world. These societies are notable by a serious lack of consensus on not only the form and functions of their government, but extreme inequalities, weak political institutions, naked struggles for wealth and power and governments debilitated by corruption and inefficiency; military rejection of civilian supremacy and discontent with the failings of civilian politics. (Rappaport, 1962, p20. in: Hague, R & Harrop, M. 1982)

Between 1945 and 1976 successful coups were carried out in half of the eighteen Asian states, and military attempts to seize power had been made in two-thirds of all Middle Eastern and North African states. (Nordlinger, 1977 in: Hague, R & Harrop, M. 1982). By 1987 out of the 53 African states, twenty seven were under military rule. In Latin America only Mexico and Costa Rice have been resistant to military intervention since 1945.

So, under what circumstances are the armed forces motivated to seize power? Finer (1975 in: Hague, R & Harrop, M. 1982) distinguishes between five classes of motive underlying military coups: national , ethnic, class, institutional, and personalist. They may apply to a particular case either singly or in combination.

National motives are employed when military intervention has been based on the officers’ conception of the national interest. This in itself can take various forms, which will be addressed later on.

Class motives can be an important part of the creed contained in the military. Soldiers might act on behalf of, or in alliance with, particular social interests. It is suggested by Needler (1968) that in Latin America military officers of middle-class background historically sided with their middle class counterparts in their struggle to wrest a share of power from the dominant landowning oligarchies. However, as pressure built up from the poor for access to the political hierarchy, reform coups gave way to veto coups. The Military switched tack and with limited exceptions became conservative defenders of the status quo against mass participation and redistribution. Throughout much of Latin America civilian governments have fallen to military intervention in the 1960’s and early 70’s, the soldiers seizing power in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and numerous other countries. In Chile, Allende’s leftwing regime was brought down by a military coup in 1973 to the applause of the middle class (Hague, R & Harrop, M. 1982).

Class divisions in post-independence Africa have less significance than ethnic affiliations. Numerous coups are an outgrowth of ethnic, regional or religious tensions within society, which are often reflected within the military itself. A good example is when the Nigerian republic was destroyed by coups driven by ethnic and regional rivalries. Ethnic factors have help to hasten coups in many other African states – including Zaire, Uganda, Chad, Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. (Hague, R & Harrop, M. 1982).

Institutional interests can sometimes also provide powerful interventionist motivies. Threats to the budget, professional autonomy or the living standards of the military have all provoked discontent in the armed forces. Six years after Nkrumah was removed as part of the 1966 Ghana coup, the soldiers overthrew the reformist government headed by Dr Busia who had tried to curb the extravagant military lifestyles. Institutional concerns can stem from grievances about promotion prospects, pay or accommodation. Resentments nursed by junior officers against their superiors are also a common recipe for formenting intervention. For the ambitious young man in Egypt, Brazil or Nigeria the army stands for and represents a modern organisation through which wealth, status and power can be achieved. If these ambitions are contained, frustration builds up. Frustration increases the likelihood of a coup. This is a prime reason as to why President Mugabe in Zimbabwe has seen fit to increase his military’s wages 100% recently. (http://allafrica.com/stories/200201040329.html). Indeed, most coups are not executed by the army as a whole unit but by a handful of conspirators utilising a faction of troops loyal to their cause.

Lastly, a military coup can be the vehicle for personal ambition. This motive typically operates in conjunction with others. In Amin’s takeover of Uganda, a drive for personal domination operated alongside resentments against the civilian regime of Obote, ethnic rivalries and military concern about its institutional position. (Decalo, S. 1976. pp201-11 in: Hague, R & Harrop, M. 1982)

Other motives put forward by Janowitz (1964) are reformist zeal, preservation of the status quo, and revolutionary goals. The military not only intervenes in politics, in many countries it also seeks to preserve its influence after giving up its rule. Thus the exit of military juntas is often based upon agreements that protect the military in various ways, including the judicial examination of crimes committed by them in power. (Lane, J. & Ersonn, S. 1994)

So why should the military consider returning power to their civilians? After all, once you have power it is only natural to want to hold onto it for as long as possible. The primary aim of any government is to seek legitimacy both with its own civilians and other states. Without legitimacy a government will struggle to survive. The former Taleban government in Afghanistan did not have a legitimate rule and was shunned by the worldwide community. Even before America began its bombing of the country there were uprisings in the form of the Northern Alliance (who eventually swept to power). Pakistan, who abandoned links with the Taleban after American pressure, was one of only three states to recognise the rule of the Taleban. The Taleban stayed in power by the use of military force, their illegitimacy as a government added to their hastened downfall. However, legitimacy isn’t the only reason a government seeks to try and hand back power to its citizens. The very logic of a military government is thus that it must sooner or later falter, as there can be no legitimate successor but a non-military regime. (Lane, J. And Ersonn, S. 1994)

Military regimes can be categorised in three policy areas: moderator, corrective or programmatic. Moderator regimes are typically conservative and have had long standing roles in the politics of Latin America. When the temperature of civilian politics reaches boiling point, the soldiers temporarily assume the reins of government in their traditional, if self-appointed, role as custodians of the regime. In effect the military will seek to hand back power to the politicians when it feels the conditions are right and will also act as a constitutional arbiter between the contending political forces.

Increasingly, military regimes are moving towards a corrective approach, attempting to reform the deep-seated conditions which provoked military involvement in the first place. These are commonly, chronic inflation, economic mismanagement, public waste and political corruption. (Hague, R and Harrop, M 1982). However, the attractions of government office pall as the military rulers realise that the problems facing their country are more deep-seated than they initially imagined and thus the military regime itself eventually becomes drawn into the net of corruption. In this case returning power back to the civilians is a very hard and long drawn out process.

Sometimes soldiers will seize power with an avowed long-term programme of development or national reconstruction. They are termed bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes by some writers, programmatic military governments seized power in much of Latin America in the 1960’s and the 1970’s. These regimes consistently failed to cope with mounting economic and social problems, and the 1980’s have been soldiers giving way to civilian politicians in countries such as Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. The exception was General Pinochet in Chile who declared that there would be no return to civilian government until the mid-1990’s. Programmatic military regimes, historically, perform generally no better than civilian governments in respect of economic competence and in some respects do worse.

Hague, R and Harrop, M (1984) sights that the critical weakness of the military regime is its preference for an “administrative style of decision-making”. This then leads to an expansion of technical roles to the abandon of political ones. The longer military governments continue, the more dependent they become on technocrats and professional administrators.

So what happens when the military decides to relinquish their rule and return democracy to their state. The withdrawal faces delicate calculations. Should the withdrawal take place in accordance with a fixed timetable? Should the military arrange the elections to choose a successor, and to what extent should it try to influence the outcome? Indeed, the military has been shown before to try and preserve its influence after giving up its rule. Thus the exit of military juntas are often based upon agreements that protect the military in numerous ways, including the judicial examination of crimes committed by them when in power. (Lane, J. And Ersonn, S. 1994)

The first step towards dismantling a dictatorship is most often initiated from within the regime itself. This usually happens as a way of increasing its legitimacy by formal concessions to democratic principles, reasons for which are evidenced above. “Tutelary” or “protected” democracy may be the aim, in order to stem any opposition. Such new flexibility may often also reflect the internally competing factions. There are two aspects to the transfer from an authoritarian to democratic regime. Firstly, there is the short term, almost technical, issue of establishing democratic institutions. These can include competitive elections and the writing of a constitution. Secondly, come the much more difficult problem of promoting factions that are conducive to long-term democratic stability. Whereas the actual replacing of dictatorial rule with democratic institutions tends to be dramatic, involving protest or violence as the old rulers try to cling to their privileges, the accomplishment of democratic stability is a slow process that is not easily brought about by fiat. (Lane, J. And Ersonn, S. 1994)

In conclusion, just as the militaries motives to intervene are diverse, the reasons for their departure are equally such. Military regimes depart in various ways – some go violently, overthrown by a popular revolt, another coup or external invasion. Most notably though is the fact that the majority of military regimes make way for civilian rule. However, this is often a delicate matter, as demonstrated previously. Most tellingly though, military force will be as insufficient in maintaining the military in office as it was necessary for obtaining power in the very first place. “Generals who fail to become politicians very quickly will very soon cease to be either.” (Hague, R & Harrop, M. 1982)

Bibliography

Decalo, S. (1976) Coups and Army Rule in Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press).

Finer, S. (1975) The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin).

Hague, R and Harrop, M (1982). Comparative Government and Politics, An Introduction, 2nd Ed. (London: Macmillan) Hong Kong. p63, 255.

Janowitz, M. (1964) The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: Chicago University Press).

Lane, J. And Ersonn, S. (1994) Comparative Politics. An Introduction and a New Approach, Cambridge: polity

Needler, M. (1968) Political Development in Latin America (New York: Random House).

Nordlinger, E. (1982) On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press).

Rappaport, D. (1962) A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types in Huntingdon, S. Changing Patterns of Military Politics, (New York: Free Press).

http://allafrica.com/stories/200201040329.html